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807 F.2d 304
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Anthony J. DeCINTIO, Peter A. Piazza,
Michael A. Garayua, Jose P. Gomes,
Angel A. Garayua, Winston P. David and
Daniel A. Samuels, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
WESTCHESTER COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER;
County of Westchester, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 161, Docket 86–7522.  | Argued
Sept. 15, 1986.  | Decided Dec. 15, 1986.
Male physical therapists brought action against employer
alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. The United States District Court for Southern
District of New York, Charles L. Brieant, Chief Judge,
found employer liable and employer appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) proscribed sex
differentiation under Title VII is distinction based on person's
sex, not on his or her sexual affiliation, and (2) employment of
female physical therapist at higher salary than male therapists
based upon consensual romantic relationship between woman
and department administrator did not constitute cause of
action under either Title VII or Equal Pay Act.
Reversed.
West Headnotes (4)
[1] Civil Rights
Sex Discrimination in General
Civil Rights
Other Particular Bases of Discrimination or
Classes Protected
78 Civil Rights
78II Employment Practices
78k1164 Sex Discrimination in General
78k1165 In General
(Formerly 78k158.1, 78k158, 78k9.14)
78 Civil Rights
78II Employment Practices
78k1231 Other Particular Bases of Discrimination
or Classes Protected
(Formerly 78k158.1, 78k158, 78k9.14)
Proscribed differentiation under Title VII must
be distinction based on person's sex, rather than
on his or her sexual affiliations. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et
seq.
67 Cases that cite this headnote
[2] Civil Rights
Welcomeness;  Consent
78 Civil Rights
78II Employment Practices
78k1181 Sexual Harassment;  Work Environment
78k1188 Welcomeness;  Consent
(Formerly 78k167, 78k9.14)
Employer can be liable for Title VII claim where
employment opportunities were granted because
of an individual's submission to employer's
sexual advances or request for sexual favors but
claim does not arise where consensual personal
relationship affected professional advancement.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
35 Cases that cite this headnote
[3] Civil Rights
Discrimination Against Men;  Reverse
Discrimination
78 Civil Rights
78II Employment Practices
78k1164 Sex Discrimination in General
78k1179 Discrimination Against Men;  Reverse
Discrimination
(Formerly 78k158.1, 78k158, 78k9.14)
Department administrator's conduct in creating
position and establishing requirements of
position in such a fashion that his girl friend
would be qualified for position of assistant
chief of department and other departmental
employees would not be eligible to apply,
though unfair, did not constitute Title VII sex
discrimination claim in that male therapists
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were not prejudiced because of their status as
males, but were discriminated against because
administrator preferred his girl friend, and any
other female applicant would face same obstacle
as male applicants. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
69 Cases that cite this headnote
[4] Labor and Employment
Discrimination in General
231H Labor and Employment
231HXIII Wages and Hours
231HXIII(C) Equal Pay
231Hk2460 Discrimination in General
231Hk2461 In General
(Formerly 232Ak1333 Labor Relations)
Even if true, allegations that department
administrator established special requirement
for position of assistant chief of department,
which paid higher salary than that paid to
other department employees, solely as pretext
to enable him to cause his girl friend to be
hired in that position, did not state cognizable
claim under Equal Pay Act, as all applicants for
position, regardless of sex, would be subject to
qualifications set by administrator. Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, § 6(d)(1), as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. § 206(d)(1).
10 Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*305  Anne Golden, White Plains, N.Y. (Silverman & Sapir,
White Plains, N.Y., Donald L. Sapir, White Plains, N.Y., of
counsel) for plaintiffs-appellees.
Colleen Lundwall Kellman, Asst. County Atty., White Plains,
N.Y. (Kenneth E. Powell, Deputy County Atty., Henry J.
Logan, Westchester County Atty., White Plains, N.Y., of
counsel), for defendants-appellants.
Before OAKES, MINER and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
Appellees Anthony J. DeCintio, Peter A. Piazza, Michael
A. Garayua, Jose P. Gomes, Angel A. Garayua, Winston
P. David and Daniel A. Samuels, seven male respiratory
therapists employed by appellant Westchester County
Medical Center (“WCMC”), brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Brieant,
J.), alleging that WCMC and appellant Westchester County
had discriminated against them on the basis of sex in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–2 (1982), and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1) (1982). The gravamen of their complaint was that they
had been unfairly disqualified from promotion to the position
of Assistant Chief Respiratory Therapist. They alleged that
when the Program Administrator of the Respiratory Therapy
Department, James Ryan, initiated the suggestion that
registration by the National Board of Respiratory Therapists
(“NBRT”) be required of all applicants for the Assistant Chief
position, he did so in order to disqualify them and to enable
him to hire Jean Guagenti, a woman with whom he was
engaged in a romantic relationship. The district court held that
the provisions of both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were
violated and awarded damages to appellees and legal fees to
their attorneys. We reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 1982, WCMC opened a regional Neonatal Intensive
Care Unit (“Neonatal ICU”) for the treatment of critically ill
newborns. The unit was staffed under the direction of Dr.
Harry Dweck, who was also Chief of the Division of Neonatal
Perinatal Medicine at New York Medical School. The staff
consisted of nurses, therapists and lab technicians. WCMC
decided to supplement the staff of the Neonatal ICU by adding
a respiratory therapist with supervisory responsibilities, at
a higher salary than other staff respiratory therapists. To
that end, WCMC announced the creation of a position for
an additional “Assistant Chief of Respiratory Therapy,” to
be assigned to the Neonatal ICU. Specifications for the
position included a “special requirement” that the applicant
be registered with the NBRT. 1  Registration by the NBRT
previously had not been a requirement for the Assistant Chief
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position, nor was it required of the head of the Respiratory
Therapy Department.
1 There are two requirements for registration: prior
experience as a respiratory care practitioner and
successful completion of an examination given by the
NBRT. Special knowledge or experience in neonatal care
is not required.
None of the appellees, all of whom were male staff
respiratory therapists at WCMC, was registered by the
NBRT. Consequently, none was qualified to apply for
the position. On April 26, 1982, Jean Guagenti, a
female respiratory therapist registered by the NBRT, was
hired for the new position by the Westchester County
Commissioner of Hospitals. The express recommendation of
Ryan, the Program Administrator of the Respiratory Therapy
Department, brought about her employment. Guagenti
formerly had been employed at WCMC as a staff respiratory
therapist until January 1982, when she left WCMC for a
position at Danbury Hospital. After her return in April 1982,
she worked in the Neonatal ICU until October 1982, when
she was reassigned to another department. She resigned from
WCMC on August 14, 1983.
*306  On May 17, 1982, appellee Anthony DeCintio
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), charging Westchester County with
sex discrimination arising from the hiring of Guagenti for the
Assistant Chief Respiratory Therapist position. He alleged,
inter alia, that the registration requirement was created in
order to exclude him from consideration for the position
and that the position specifically was created for Guagenti.
The EEOC referred the complaint to the New York State
Division on Human Rights (“State Division”) for review of
the merits of the case. On March 24, 1983, the other six
appellees filed similar complaints with the State Division.
The State Division's investigation resulted in dismissal of
the complaint, based on a lack of credible evidence that the
certification requirement was pretextual. The EEOC adopted
this finding.
After the appropriate review of the administrative
determinations, appellees brought this action in the district
court, alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act. After a two-day trial, the district court determined that:
1) “[p]ersons other than” Ryan concluded that a respiratory
therapist was needed in the Neonatal ICU; 2) Ryan initiated
the creation of a second Assistant Chief position; 3) Ryan
initiated the addition of a registration requirement for that
position; 4) the new requirement was “a pretext and a part
of a scheme or plan” on Ryan's part to obtain the position
for Guagenti; 5) Ryan and Guagenti had been engaged in
an ongoing, consensual, romantic relationship at the time
Guagenti was hired to be an Assistant Chief at WCMC; and
6) appellants paid Guagenti more than appellees for equal
work when the performance of their respective jobs required
substantially equal skill, effort, or responsibilities performed
under similar working conditions. Based on these findings,
the district court held that appellants had violated the Equal
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e. The court awarded damages and attorney's fees to each
appellee. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
The dispositive issue in this action is whether, under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1982), the phrase “discrimination on the basis of sex”
encompasses disparate treatment premised not on one's
gender, but rather on a romantic relationship between an
employer and a person preferentially hired. The meaning of
“sex,” for Title VII purposes, thereby would be expanded to
include “sexual liaisons” and “sexual attractions.” Such an
overbroad definition is wholly unwarranted.
[1]  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination in employment “against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)
(1). As the Supreme Court noted in Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, –––U.S. ––––, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d
49 (1986), because the word “sex” was added to Title VII
shortly before passage, “we are left with little legislative
history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against
discrimination based on ‘sex.’ ” Id. at ––––, 106 S.Ct.
at 2404. However, the other categories afforded protection
under Title VII refer to a person's status as a member of a
particular race, color, religion or nationality. “Sex,” when
read in this context, logically could only refer to membership
in a class delineated by gender, rather than sexual activity
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regardless of gender. As the Supreme Court noted in Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53
L.Ed.2d 113 (1977), “[t]he emphasis of both the language
and the legislative history of [Title VII] is on eliminating
discrimination in employment; similarly situated employees
are not to be treated differently solely because they differ
with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Id. at 71, 97 S.Ct. at 2270 (emphasis added). The proscribed
differentiation under Title VII, therefore, must be *307  a
distinction based on a person's sex, not on his or her sexual
affiliations. See Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1375
n. 13, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.) (Title VII was intended
to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women”), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991, 92 S.Ct. 536, 30
L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)); see also Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2404
(quoting same).
In King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C.Cir.1985), the
D.C.Circuit implicitly recognized a Title VII action alleging
discrimination premised on a voluntary sexual relationship.
The court noted, however, that the question whether a
consensual sexual relationship can form the basis of a Title
VII claim had not been presented on appeal. Id. at 880.
Additionally, six judges of that court, in denying a suggestion
for rehearing en banc and a motion by the government
regarding the filing of an amicus brief, emphasized that the
applicability of Title VII to the facts before them was not
raised on appeal, and thus was not the proper subject of a
rehearing en banc. Id. at 883. To the extent that King and cases
following King, e.g., Kersul v. Skulls Angels Inc., 130 Misc.2d
345, 495 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup.Ct.1985), can be interpreted
as recognizing Title VII claims for non-gender based sex
discrimination, we decline to adopt such a broad extension of
Title VII protection.
Title VII claims have been employed successfully to combat
instances of sex discrimination with respect to terms and
conditions of employment, e.g., Mills v. Ford Motor Co.,
800 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.1986), as well as sexual harassment
in the workplace, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct.
2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (“hostile environment” sexual
harassment); see generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.Fed. 252 (1986).
In all of these cases, however, there existed a causal
connection between the gender of the individual or class
and the resultant preference or disparity. Many courts have
limited the word “sex” to its “traditional definition,” Sommers
v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.1982),
and refused to extend Title VII proscriptions beyond gender-
based discrimination. See, e.g. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.1984) (transsexuality), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 2032, 85 L.Ed.2d 304 (1985);
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th
Cir.1982) (same); DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.1979) (homosexuality); Smith v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.1978)
(effeminacy). We can adduce no justification for defining
“sex,” for Title VII purposes, so broadly as to include an
ongoing, voluntary, romantic engagement.
Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F.Supp. 1197 (D.Del.1983), relied on
by appellees, does not mandate a contrary result. In Toscano,
a female employee alleged, and the district court found, that
the granting of sexual favors was a condition to receiving
promotion, in violation of Title VII. Although the district
court permitted the female employee to prove her claim with
circumstantial evidence of the sexual relationship between
the employer and the successful applicant, the claim itself
was premised on the coercive nature of the employer's acts,
rather than the fact of the relationship itself. The Title VII
action at issue in Toscano, therefore, was the substantial
equivalent of a “sexual harassment” suit. The decision in
Toscano lends no support to the contention that a voluntary
amorous involvement may form the basis of a Title VII claim.
[2]  The EEOC's guidelines fail to buttress appellees'
contentions. The guidelines provide that “[w]here
employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of
an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances
or requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable
for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who
were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity
or benefit.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1986) (emphasis added).
The word “submission,” in this context, clearly involves a
*308  lack of consent and implies a necessary element of
coercion or harassment. In addition, the EEOC has indicated
that sexual relationships between coworkers should not be
subject to Title VII scrutiny, so long as they are personal,
social relationships. See Preamble to Interim Guidelines
on Sex Discrimination, 45 Fed.Reg. 25024 (1980). While
appellees do claim that the liaison between Ryan and
Guagenti became more than a private affair when it affected
their professional lives, appellees do not claim that they or
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any other staff members, including Guagenti, were forced to
submit to Ryan's sexual advances in order to win promotion.
[3]  Even assuming that appellees' allegations are true and
that the district court's findings are correct, appellees have not
set forth a cognizable Title VII claim for sex discrimination.
Appellees allege, and the district court found, that Ryan
and Guagenti were engaged in a romantic partnership; that
Ryan established a special requirement for the Assistant Chief
position solely as a pretext to enable him to cause Guagenti
to be hired; that appellees were precluded from applying
for the position due to the special requirement; and that
Guagenti was hired on the recommendation of Ryan. Ryan's
conduct, although unfair, simply did not violate Title VII.
Appellees were not prejudiced because of their status as
males; rather, they were discriminated against because Ryan
preferred his paramour. Appellees faced exactly the same
predicament as that faced by any woman applicant for the
promotion: No one but Guagenti could be considered for
the appointment because of Guagenti's special relationship
to Ryan. That relationship forms the basis of appellees'
sex discrimination claims. Appellees' proffered interpretation
of Title VII prohibitions against sex discrimination would
involve the EEOC and federal courts in the policing of
intimate relationships. Such a course, founded on a distortion
of the meaning of the word “sex” in the context of Title VII,
is both impracticable and unwarranted.
[4]  Appellees' Equal Pay Act claim suffers the same fatal
defect. The Equal Pay Act prohibits an employer from
discriminating between employees “on the basis of sex by
paying wages ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions....” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). Again,
the problem confronting appellees is the proper definition
of sex discrimination. The Supreme Court, in discussing the
Equal Pay Act, made clear that the fundamental purpose of the
Act was to remedy disparities in pay arising from traditional
concepts of gender. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417
U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). We
perceive no valid justification for defining “sex” for Equal
Pay Act purposes in a manner inconsistent with the word's
meaning under Title VII. Accordingly, appellees' Equal Pay
Act claim must fail as well.
In sum, we hold that voluntary, romantic relationships cannot
form the basis of a sex discrimination suit under either Title
VII or the Equal Pay Act. Because that determination is
dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the other issues
raised by appellants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court
is reversed.
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